

# Linear Cryptanalysis of MORUS

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#### MILP-aided search for reduced MORUS.

- ▶ Integral distinguishers for 6.5 steps of MORUS-640.
- ▶ Differential distinguishers for 4.5 steps of MORUS-1280.

MORUS design

► 🚳 Analysis of MINIMORUS

► 📦 Application to MORUS



▶ Family of authenticated ciphers by Wu and Huang

• MORUS-640 with 128-bit key

- MORUS-1280-128 with 128-bit key
- MORUS-1280-256 with 256-bit key

 $S_0$   $S_1$   $S_2$   $S_3$   $S_4$ 

 $5 \times 4 \times 32$ -bit words

 $5\times4\times64\text{-bit}$  words

 $\blacktriangleright$  Security claim for confidentiality = key size; re-key every 2<sup>64</sup> blocks

► CAESAR finalist for Use-Case 2 (High Performance)

## MORUS Authenticated Cipher (simplified)



Initialization: a  $S_0 = N$ ,  $S_1 = K$ b  $16 \times \text{StateUpdate}(0)$ C  $S_1 = S_1 \oplus K$ 2 Encryption: For each msg block  $M_i$ : a  $C_i = M_i \oplus \intercal(S_0, \ldots, S_3)$ **b** STATEUPDATE  $\mathcal{C}(M_i)$ 3 Finalization: a  $S_4 = S_4 \oplus S_0$ b  $10 \times \text{STATEUPDATE} \mathcal{C}(\text{len}(M))$  $\subset$   $T = \Upsilon(S_0, \ldots, S_3)$ 

# MORUS Authenticated Cipher (simplified)



2 Encryption: For each msg block  $M_i$ : a  $C_i = M_i \oplus \intercal(S_0, \ldots, S_3)$ b STATEUPDATE  $\mathcal{C}(M_i)$ 

#### **MORUS STATEUPDATE Function**



- ▶ Nonlinearity: "Toffoli" gate  $z = z \oplus (x \odot y)$
- ▶ Diffusion:

Xors  $z = z \oplus x$ 

Rotation within words  $\boxed{\ll r}$ 

Rotate words <u>wrw</u>

## **MINIMORUS STATEUPDATE Function**





 $\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x} &= \mathbf{u} \oplus \mathbf{y} \oplus (\mathbf{z} \wedge \mathbf{t}) \\ \text{Can be linear approximated with} \\ \text{E: } \mathbf{x} &= \mathbf{u} \oplus \mathbf{y} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr(E) = \frac{3}{4} \end{aligned}$ 

The *bias*  $\varepsilon$  is:

$$\Pr(E) = \frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon \implies \varepsilon = \frac{1}{4}$$

The correlation and weight of an approximation is:

$$\operatorname{cor}(E) := 2\varepsilon$$
  
weight $(E) := -\log_2 |\operatorname{cor}(E)| \implies \operatorname{weight}(E) = 1$ 

#### Pilling Up Lemma (Matsui M., 1993)

The correlation (resp. weight) of an XOR of independent variables is equal to the product (resp. sum) of their individual correlations (resp. weights)

## **MINIMORUS:** Approximation fragments $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \varepsilon$



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# **Building Trails**



 $S_0$  $S_1$   $S_2$   $S_3$   $S_4$ С 0 0 Bo

 $11 \, / \, 16$ 





 $11 \, / \, 16$ 

















 $11 \, / \, 16$ 



11/16

## **MINIMORUS:** Weight of $\beta_i^t \oplus \gamma_i^t$



Weight of  $\beta_i^t \oplus \gamma_i^t$  is 0 (not 2).

#### **MINIMORUS-640: Weight corrected**



13/16

## **MINIMORUS: Final Approximation**

- $\blacktriangleright \text{ MINIMORUS-1280} \\ C_{51}^0 \oplus C_0^1 \oplus C_{25}^1 \oplus C_{33}^1 \oplus C_{55}^1 \oplus C_4^2 \oplus C_7^2 \oplus C_{29}^2 \oplus C_{37}^2 \oplus C_{38}^2 \oplus C_{46}^2 \oplus C_{51}^2 \oplus C_{11}^3 \oplus C_{20}^3 \oplus C_{42}^3 \oplus C_{50}^3 \oplus C_{24}^4 \to 0$

- ▶ Total weight of  $\chi$ : 7 + 9 = 16.
- ▶ Experimentally verified
  - Analysis of the Algebraic Normal Form
  - Measurements on random inputs (slightly better than expected)



# $\square = \square + \square + \square + \square$ S<sub>i,j</sub> in MINIMORUS = S<sub>i,j</sub> $\oplus$ S<sub>i,j+w</sub> $\oplus$ S<sub>i,j+2w</sub> $\oplus$ S<sub>i,j+3w</sub> in MORUS

**Weight** ×4, except  $\beta_i + \gamma_i$  has weight 0 in MINIMORUS but 3 in MORUS

MORUS-640: Weight  $4 \times 16 + 3 \times 3 = 73 \rightarrow \text{data complexity} \approx 2^{146}$ MORUS-1280: Weight  $4 \times 16 + 4 \times 3 = 76 \rightarrow \text{data complexity} \approx 2^{152}$ 

trail is immune to bit-shift: actual data complexity is about a factor of 2<sup>5</sup> to 2<sup>6</sup> lower

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▶ Weight ×4, except  $\beta_i + \gamma_i$  has weight 0 in MINIMORUS but 3 in MORUS

ORUS-640: Weight 4 × 16 + 3 × 3 = 73 → data complexity ≈ 2<sup>146</sup>
MORUS-1280: Weight 4 × 16 + 4 × 3 = 76 → data complexity ≈ 2<sup>152</sup>

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#### ► Keystream correlation

- The bias is *independent* of Key or Nounce!
- Known plaintext  $\implies$  Distinguisher.
- Multiple fixed plaintext  $\implies$  plaintext recovery.
- Similar to RC4, BEAST attack...

#### Data complexity

- Data limit 2<sup>64</sup>... but correlation holds under rekeying.
- Require 2<sup>141</sup> blocks for MORUS-640
- Require 2<sup>146</sup> blocks for MORUS-1280 (violate 256-bit confidentiality claim)
- Not practical ;-)

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# https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/464.pdf