




A Coq proof of the correctness of X25519 in TweetNaCl

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




Prelude




Public parameter: point P , curve E over \mathbb{K}



Operations on E : $By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$

(1) $P \mapsto [2]P$

(2) $\{P, Q\} \mapsto P + Q$




W.Del NOMINE

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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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W-Del-NOMINEE


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


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Operations on \mathbb{P}

(1) $\mathbf{x}\text{DBL} : \mathbf{x}(P) \mapsto \mathbf{x}([2]P)$


(2) $\{\mathbf{x}(P), \mathbf{x}(Q)\} \mapsto \{\mathbf{x}(P + Q), \mathbf{x}(P - Q)\}$

W.Del-NOMINE

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Operations on \mathbb{P}

(1) $\mathbf{xDBL} : \mathbf{x}(P) \mapsto \mathbf{x}([2]P)$

(2) $\mathbf{xADD} : \{\mathbf{x}(P), \mathbf{x}(Q), \mathbf{x}(P - Q)\} \mapsto \mathbf{x}(P + Q)$

W-Del-NOMINEE

Montgomery ladder

Algorithm 1 Montgomery ladder for scalar mult.

Input: x-coordinate x_P of a point P , scalar n with $n < 2^m$

Output: x-coordinate x_Q of $Q = n \cdot P$

$Q = (X_Q : Z_Q) \leftarrow (1 : 0)$

$R = (X_R : Z_R) \leftarrow (x_P : 1)$

for $k := m$ down to 1 **do**

$(Q, R) \leftarrow \text{CSWAP}((Q, R), k^{\text{th}} \text{ bit of } n)$

$Q \leftarrow \text{xDBL}(Q)$

$R \leftarrow \text{xADD}(x_P, Q, R)$

$(Q, R) \leftarrow \text{CSWAP}((Q, R), k^{\text{th}} \text{ bit of } n)$

end for

return X_Q/Z_Q



A quick overview of TweetNaCl




crypto_scalarmult

```
int crypto_scalarmult(u8 *q,const u8 *n,const u8 *p)
{
    u8 z[32]; i64 r; int i; gf x,a,b,c,d,e,f;
    FOR(i,31) z[i]=n[i];
    z[31]=(n[31]&127)|64; z[0]&=248;                      # Clamping of n
    unpack25519(x,p);
    FOR(i,16) { b[i]=x[i]; d[i]=a[i]=c[i]=0; }
    a[0]=d[0]=1;
    for(i=254;i>=0;--i) {
        r=(z[i>>3]>>(i&7))&1;                         # i^th bit of n
        sel25519(a,b,r);
        sel25519(c,d,r);
        A(e,a,c);                                         #
        Z(a,a,c);                                         #
        A(c,b,d);                                         #
        Z(b,b,d);                                         #
        S(d,e);                                           #
        S(f,a);                                           #
        M(a,c,a);                                         # Montgomery Ladder
        M(c,b,e);
        A(e,a,c);
        Z(a,a,c);
        S(b,a);
        Z(c,d,f);
        M(a,c,_121665);
        A(a,a,d);
        M(c,c,a);
        M(a,d,f);
        M(d,b,x);
        S(b,e);
        sel25519(a,b,r);
        sel25519(c,d,r);
    }
    inv25519(c,c); M(a,a,c);                           # a / c
    pack25519(q,a);
    return 0;
}
```

In De Nomine

256-bits integers do not fit into a 64-bits containers...



Basic Operations

```
#define FOR(i,n) for (i = 0;i < n;++i)
#define sv static void
typedef long long i64;
typedef i64 gf[16];

sv A(gf o,const gf a,const gf b)      # Addition
{
    int i;
    FOR(i,16) o[i]=a[i]+b[i];           # carrying is done separately
}

sv Z(gf o,const gf a,const gf b)      # Zubtraction
{
    int i;
    FOR(i,16) o[i]=a[i]-b[i];           # carrying is done separately
}

sv M(gf o,const gf a,const gf b)      # Multiplication (school book)
{
    i64 i,j,t[31];
    FOR(i,31) t[i]=0;
    FOR(i,16) FOR(j,16) t[i+j] = a[i]*b[j];
    FOR(i,15) t[i]+=38*t[i+16];
    FOR(i,16) o[i]=t[i];
    car25519(o);                      # carrying
    car25519(o);                      # carrying
}
```



Formalizing X25519 from RFC 7748



The specification of X25519 in RFC 7748 is formalized by RFC in Coq.

More formally:

```
Definition RFC (n: list Z) (p: list Z) : list Z :=
  let k := decodeScalar25519 n in
  let u := decodeUCoordinate p in
  let t := montgomery_rec
    255 (* iterate 255 times *)
    k (* clamped n *)
    1 (* x2 *)
    u (* x3 *)
    0 (* z2 *)
    1 (* z3 *)
    0 (* dummy *)
    0 (* dummy *)
    u (* x1 *) in
  let a := get_a t in
  let c := get_c t in
  let o := ZPack25519 (Z.mul a (ZInv25519 c))
  in encodeUCoordinate o.
```



```

Fixpoint montgomery_rec (m : nat) (z : T')
  (a: T) (b: T) (c: T) (d: T) (e: T) (f: T) (x: T) :
(* a: x2 b: x3 c: z2 d: z3 x: x1 *)
(T * T * T * T * T) :=
match m with
| 0%nat => (a,b,c,d,e,f)
| S n =>
  let r := Getbit (Z.of_nat n) z in
    (* swap ← k_t *)
    let (a, b) := (Sel25519 r a b, Sel25519 r b a) in (* (x2, x3) = cswap(swap, x2, x3) *)
    let (c, d) := (Sel25519 r c d, Sel25519 r d c) in (* (z2, z3) = cswap(swap, z2, z3) *)
      let e := a + c in (* A = x2 + z2 *)
      let a := a - c in (* B = x2 - z2 *)
      let c := b + d in (* C = x3 + z3 *)
      let b := b - d in (* D = x3 - z3 *)
        let d := e 2 in (* AA = A2 *)
        let f := a 2 in (* BB = B2 *)
        let a := c * a in (* CB = C * B *)
        let c := b * e in (* DA = D * A *)
          let e := a + c in (* x3 = (DA + CB)2 *)
          let a := a - c in (* z3 = x1 * (DA - CB)2 *)
            let b := a 2 in (* z3 = x1 * (DA - CB)2 *)
            let c := d - f in (* E = AA - BB *)
            let a := c * C_121665 in (* z2 = E * (AA + a24 * E) *)
            let a := a + d in (* z2 = E * (AA + a24 * E) *)
            let c := c * a in (* z2 = E * (AA + a24 * E) *)
            let a := d * f in (* x2 = AA * BB *)
              let d := b * x in (* z3 = x1 * (DA - CB)2 *)
              let b := e 2 in (* x3 = (DA + CB)2 *)
              let (a, b) := (Sel25519 r a b, Sel25519 r b a) in (* (x2, x3) = cswap(swap, x2, x3) *)
              let (c, d) := (Sel25519 r c d, Sel25519 r d c) in (* (z2, z3) = cswap(swap, z2, z3) *)
montgomery_rec n z a b c d e f x
end.

```

Let *ZofList* : $\mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \text{list } \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$, a function given n and a list I returns its little endian decoding with radix 2^n .

```
Fixpoint ZofList {n:Z} (a:list Z) : Z :=
  match a with
  | [] ⇒ 0
  | h :: q ⇒ h + 2n * ZofList q
  end.
```

Let *ListofZ32* : $\mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \text{list } \mathbb{Z}$, given n and a returns a 's little-endian encoding as a list with radix 2^n .

```
Fixpoint ListofZn_fp {n:Z} (a:Z) (f:nat) : list Z :=
  match f with
  | 0%nat ⇒ []
  | S fuel ⇒ (a mod 2n) :: ListofZn_fp (a/2n) fuel
  end.

Definition ListofZ32 {n:Z} (a:Z) : list Z :=
  ListofZn_fp n a 32.
```

`ListofZ32` and `ZofList` are inverse to each other.

```
Lemma ListofZ32_ZofList_Zlength: forall (l:list Z),
  Forall (λ x ⇒ 0 ≤ x < 2n) l →
  Zlength l = 32 →
  ListofZ32 n (ZofList n l) = l.
Qed.
```

With those tools at hand, we formally define the decoding and encoding as specified in the RFC.

```
Definition decodeScalar25519 (l: list Z) : Z :=
  ZofList 8 (clamp l).

Definition decodeUCoordinate (l: list Z) : Z :=
  ZofList 8 (upd_nth 31 1
    (Z.land (nth 31 1 0) 127)).

Definition encodeUCoordinate (x: Z) : list Z :=
  ListofZ32 8 x.
```



From C to Coq




$\{\text{Pre}\} \text{ Prog } \{\text{Post}\}$

where **Pre** and **Post** are assertions and Prog is a fragment of code.

“when the precondition **Pre** is met, executing Prog will yield postcondition **Post**”.

Sequent Rule in Hoare logic:

$$\text{Hoare-Sq} \frac{\{P\} C_1 \{Q\} \quad \{Q\} C_2 \{R\}}{\{P\} C_1; C_2 \{R\}}$$



Specification: Addition

```
Fixpoint Low.A (a b : list  $\mathbb{Z}$ ) : list  $\mathbb{Z}$  :=
  match a,b with
  | [], q => q
  | q, [] => q
  | h1::q1,h2::q2 => (Z.add h1 h2) :: Low.A q1 q2
  end.
```

```
Notation "a  $\boxplus$  b" := (Low.A a b) (at level 60).
```

```
Corollary A_correct:
  forall (a b: list  $\mathbb{Z}$ ),
    ZofList 16 (a  $\boxplus$  b) = (ZofList 16 a) + (ZofList 16 b).
Qed.
```

```
Lemma A_bound_len:
  forall (m1 n1 m2 n2:  $\mathbb{Z}$ ) (a b: list  $\mathbb{Z}$ ),
    length a = length b  $\rightarrow$ 
    Forall ( $\lambda x \Rightarrow m1 < x < n1$ ) a  $\rightarrow$ 
    Forall ( $\lambda x \Rightarrow m2 < x < n2$ ) b  $\rightarrow$ 
      Forall ( $\lambda x \Rightarrow m1 + m2 < x < n1 + n2$ ) (a  $\boxplus$  b).
Qed.
```

```
Lemma A_length_16:
  forall (a b: list  $\mathbb{Z}$ ),
    length a = 16  $\rightarrow$ 
    length b = 16  $\rightarrow$ 
      length (a  $\boxplus$  b) = 16.
Qed.
```

Verification: Addition (with VST)

```
Definition A_spec :=
DECLARE _A
WITH
  v_o: val, v_a: val, v_b: val,
  sh : share,
  o : list val,
  a : list Z, amin : Z, amax : Z,
  b : list Z, bmin : Z, bmax : Z,
(*-----*)
PRE [ _o OF (tptr tlg), _a OF (tptr tlg), _b OF (tptr tlg) ]
  PROP (writable_share sh;
        (* For soundness *)                      (* For bounds propagation *)
        Forall (λx ↦ -262 < x < 262) a;           Forall (λx ↦ amin < x < amax) a;
        Forall (λx ↦ -262 < x < 262) b;           Forall (λx ↦ bmin < x < bmax) b;

        Zlength a = 16; Zlength b = 16; Zlength o = 16)
LOCAL (temp _a v_a; temp _b v_b; temp _o v_o)
SEP (sh{ v_o } ←(lg16)– o;
      sh{ v_a } ←(lg16)– mVI64 a;
      sh{ v_b } ←(lg16)– mVI64 b)

(*-----*)
POST [ tvoid ]
  PROP (* Bounds propagation *)
    Forall (λx ↦ amin + bmin < x < amax + bmax) (Low.A a b)
    Zlength (A a b) = 16;
  )
LOCAL()
SEP (sh{ v_o } ←(lg16)– mVI64 (Low.A a b);
      sh{ v_a } ←(lg16)– mVI64 a;
      sh{ v_b } ←(lg16)– mVI64 b.
```

```
sv A(gf o,const gf a,const gf b)
{
  int i;
  FOR(i,16) o[i]=a[i]+b[i];
}
```

W-Der-NOMINE

- (1) We define Low.A; Low.M; Low.Sq; Low.Zub; Unpack25519; clamp; Pack25519; Inv25519; car25519 to have the same behavior as the low level C code.
- (2) We define Crypto_Scalarmult with Low.A; Low.M; Low.Sq; Low.Zub; Unpack25519; clamp; Pack25519; Inv25519; car25519; montgomery_rec.
- (3) We prove that Low.M; Low.A; Low.Sq; Low.Zub; Unpack25519; clamp; Pack25519; Inv25519; car25519 have the same behavior over `list Z` as their equivalent over `Z` with `:GF` (in $\mathbb{Z}_{2^{255}-19}$).
- (4) We prove that Crypto_Scalarmult performs the same computation as RFC.

Lemma Crypto_Scalarmult_RFC_eq :

```
forall (n: list Z) (p: list Z),
Zlength n = 32 →
Zlength p = 32 →
Forall (λ x ⇒ 0 ≤ x ∧ x < 28) n →
Forall (λ x ⇒ 0 ≤ x ∧ x < 28) p →
Crypto_Scalarmult n p = RFC n p.
```

Qed.

Hoare Triple of crypto_scalarmult

```
Definition crypto_scalarmult_spec :=
DECLARE _crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_tweet
WITH
  v_q: val, v_n: val, v_p: val, c121665:val,
  sh : share,
  q : list val, n : list Z, p : list Z
(*-----*)
PRE [ _q OF (tptr uchar), _n OF (tptr uchar), _p OF (tptr uchar) ]
PROP (writable_share sh;
      Forall ( $\lambda x \mapsto 0 \leq x < 2^8$ ) p;
      Forall ( $\lambda x \mapsto 0 \leq x < 2^8$ ) n;
      Zlength q = 32;
      Zlength n = 32;
      Zlength p = 32)
LOCAL(temp _q v_q; temp _n v_n; temp _p v_p; gvar __121665 c121665)
SEP (sh{ v_q } $\leftarrow$ (uch32) $\leftarrow$  q;
     sh{ v_n } $\leftarrow$ (uch32) $\leftarrow$  mVI n;
     sh{ v_p } $\leftarrow$ (uch32) $\leftarrow$  mVI p;
     Ews{ c121665 } $\leftarrow$ (lg16) $\leftarrow$  mVI64 c_121665)
(*-----*)
POST [ tint ]
PROP (Forall ( $\lambda x \mapsto 0 \leq x < 2^8$ ) (RFC n p);
      Zlength (RFC n p) = 32)
LOCAL(temp ret_temp (Vint Int.zero))
SEP (sh{ v_q } $\leftarrow$ (uch32) $\leftarrow$  mVI (RFC n p);
     sh{ v_n } $\leftarrow$ (uch32) $\leftarrow$  mVI n;
     sh{ v_p } $\leftarrow$ (uch32) $\leftarrow$  mVI p;
     Ews{ c121665 } $\leftarrow$ (lg16) $\leftarrow$  mVI64 c_121665
```

TweetNaCl implements correctly the RFC

*The implementation of X25519 in TweetNaCl (`crypto_scalarmult`)
matches the specifications of RFC 7748 (RFC).*

More formally:

```
Theorem body_crypto_scalarmult:  
  (* VST boiler plate. *)  
  semax_body  
    (* Clight translation of TweetNaCl. *)  
    Vprog  
    (* Hoare triples for function calls. *)  
    Gprog  
    (* function we verify. *)  
    f_crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_tweet  
    (* Our Hoare triple, see below. *)  
    crypto_scalarmult_spec .
```



Formalization of Elliptic Curves



Formal definition of a point

```
Inductive point ( $\mathbb{K}$ : Type) : Type :=  
  (* A point is either at Infinity *)  
  | EC_Inf : point  $\mathbb{K}$   
  (* or  $(x, y)$  *)  
  | EC_In :  $\mathbb{K} \rightarrow \mathbb{K} \rightarrow$  point  $\mathbb{K}$ .
```

Notation " ∞ " := (@EC_Inf _).

Notation " $(| x, y |)$ " := (@EC_In _ x y).

(* Get the x coordinate of p or 0 *)

```
Definition point_x0 (p : point  $\mathbb{K}$ ) :=  
  if p is  $(| x, y |)$  then x else 0.
```

Notation " $p.x$ " := (point_x0 p).

Formal definition of a curve

Definition

Let $a \in \mathbb{K} \setminus \{-2, 2\}$, and $b \in \mathbb{K} \setminus \{0\}$. The elliptic curve $M_{a,b}$ is defined by the equation:

$$by^2 = x^3 + ax^2 + x,$$

$M_{a,b}(\mathbb{K})$ is the set of all points $(x, y) \in \mathbb{K}^2$ satisfying the $M_{a,b}$ along with an additional formal point \mathcal{O} , "at infinity".

(* $B y = x^3 + A x^2 + x *$)

Record mcuType := { A: \mathbb{K} ; B: \mathbb{K} ; _ : $B \neq 0$; _ : $A^2 \neq 4$ }

(* is a point p on the curve? *)

Definition oncurve (p : point K) :=

if p is (| x, y |)

then cB * y² == x³ + cA * x² + x

else true.

(* We define a point on a curve as a point and the proof that it is on the curve *)

Inductive mc : Type := MC p of oncurve p.

Formal definition of the operations over a curve

Definition `neg (p: point K) :=
if p is (| x, y |) then (| x, -y |) else ∞.`

Definition `add (p1 p2: point K) :=
match p1 , p2 with
| ∞, - ⇒ p2
| -, ∞ ⇒ p1
| (| x1, y1 |), (| x2, y2 |) ⇒
 if x1 == x2 then
 if (y1 == y2) && (y1 ≠ 0) then ...
 else
 ∞
 else
 let s := (y2 - y1) / (x2 - x1) in
 let xs := s2 * B - A - x1 - x2 in
 (| xs, -s * (xs - x1) - y1 |)
end`

(* If one point is infinity *)
(* If one point is infinity *)
(* If p1 = p2 *)
(* If p1 ≠ p2 *)

Notation " $-x$ " := (`neg x`).

Notation " $x + y$ " := (`add x y`).

Notation " $x - y$ " := ($x + (-y)$).



We define χ and χ_0 to return the x -coordinate of points on a curve.

Definition

Let χ and χ_0 :

– $\chi : M_{a,b}(\mathbb{K}) \rightarrow \mathbb{K} \cup \{\infty\}$

such that $\chi(\mathcal{O}) = \infty$ and $\chi((x, y)) = x$.

– $\chi_0 : M_{a,b}(\mathbb{K}) \rightarrow \mathbb{K}$

such that $\chi_0(\mathcal{O}) = 0$ and $\chi_0((x, y)) = x$.

Montgomery curves make use of projective coordinates. Points are represented with triples $(X : Y : Z)$, with the exception of $(0 : 0 : 0)$

For all $\lambda \neq 0$, the triples $(X : Y : Z)$ and $(\lambda X : \lambda Y : \lambda Z)$ represent the same point.

For $Z \neq 0$, the projective point $(X : Y : Z)$ corresponds to the point $(X/Z, Y/Z)$ on the affine plane.

Likewise the point (X, Y) on the affine plane corresponds to $(X : Y : 1)$ on the projective plane.

Lemma

Let $M_{a,b}$ be a Montgomery curve such that $a^2 - 4$ is not a square in \mathbb{K} , and let $X_1, Z_1, X_2, Z_2, X_4, Z_4 \in \mathbb{K}$, such that $(X_1, Z_1) \neq (0, 0)$, $(X_2, Z_2) \neq (0, 0)$, $X_4 \neq 0$ and $Z_4 \neq 0$. Define

$$\begin{aligned} X_3 &= Z_4((X_1 - Z_1)(X_2 + Z_2) + (X_1 + Z_1)(X_2 - Z_2))^2 \\ Z_3 &= X_4((X_1 - Z_1)(X_2 + Z_2) - (X_1 + Z_1)(X_2 - Z_2))^2, \end{aligned}$$

then for any point P_1 and P_2 in $M_{a,b}(\mathbb{K})$ such that $X_1/Z_1 = \chi(P_1)$, $X_2/Z_2 = \chi(P_2)$, and $X_4/Z_4 = \chi(P_1 - P_2)$, we have $X_3/Z_3 = \chi(P_1 + P_2)$.

Remark: These definitions should be understood in $\mathbb{K} \cup \{\infty\}$. If $x \neq 0$ then we define $x/0 = \infty$.

Lemma

Let $M_{a,b}$ be a Montgomery curve such that $a^2 - 4$ is not a square in \mathbb{K} , and let $X_1, Z_1 \in \mathbb{K}$, such that $(X_1, Z_1) \neq (0, 0)$. Define

$$\begin{aligned}c &= (X_1 + Z_1)^2 - (X_1 - Z_1)^2 \\X_3 &= (X_1 + Z_1)^2(X_1 - Z_1)^2 \\Z_3 &= c\left((X_1 + Z_1)^2 + \frac{a-2}{4} \times c\right),\end{aligned}$$

then for any point P_1 in $M_{a,b}(\mathbb{K})$ such that $X_1/Z_1 = \chi(P_1)$, we have $X_3/Z_3 = \chi(2P_1)$.

Correctness of the Montgomery ladder

By combining the Montgomery ladder with the previous formula, we define a ladder `opt_montgomery` (in which \mathbb{K} has not been fixed yet).

Hypothesis

$a^2 - 4$ is not a square in \mathbb{K} .

We prove its correctness.

Theorem

For all $n, m \in \mathbb{N}$, $x \in \mathbb{K}$, $P \in M_{a,b}(\mathbb{K})$, if $\chi_0(P) = x$ then `opt_montgomery` returns $\chi_0(n \cdot P)$

Theorem `opt_montgomery_ok` (n m : `nat`) (x : K) :

$n < 2^m \rightarrow$

`forall` (p : `mc M`), $p \# x_0 = x$

(* if x is the x -coordinate of P *)

\rightarrow `opt_montgomery n m x = (p *+ n) # x_0.`

(* `opt_montgomery n m xp` is the x -coordinate of $n \cdot P$ *).

Qed.

Problem !

$a^2 - 4$ is a square in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}



(* $a^2 - 4$ is not a square in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$. *)

Fact a_not_square : forall x: $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$,
 $x^2 \neq (\text{Zmodp.pi } 486662)^2 - 4$.

(* 2 is not a square in $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$. *)

Fact two_not_square : forall x: $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$,
 $x^2 \neq 2$.

We now consider $M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_p)$ and $M_{486662,2}(\mathbb{F}_p)$, one of its quadratic twists.

Definition

We instantiate *opt_montgomery* in two specific ways:

- *Curve25519_Fp(n, x)* for $M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_p)$.
- *Twist25519_Fp(n, x)* for $M_{486662,2}(\mathbb{F}_p)$.

Curve25519_Fp(n, x) and *Twist25519_Fp(n, x)* do not depend on *b*.

Lemma curve_twist_eq: forall n x,
curve25519_Fp_ladder n x = twist25519_Fp_ladder n x.

Qed.

We derive the following two lemmas:

Lemma

For all $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$, $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $P \in \mathbb{F}_p \times \mathbb{F}_p$, such that $P \in M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_p)$ and $\chi_0(P) = x$.

Given n and x , $\text{Curve25519_Fp}(n, x) = \chi_0(n \cdot P)$.

Lemma

For all $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$, $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $P \in \mathbb{F}_p \times \mathbb{F}_p$ such that $P \in M_{486662,2}(\mathbb{F}_p)$ and $\chi_0(P) = x$.

Given n and x , $\text{Twist25519_Fp}(n, x) = \chi_0(n \cdot P)$.

As 2 is not a square in \mathbb{F}_p we have:

Lemma

For all x in \mathbb{F}_p , there exists y in \mathbb{F}_p such that $y^2 = x \vee 2y^2 = x$

Thus:

Lemma

For all $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$, there exists a point P in $M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_p)$ or in $M_{486662,2}(\mathbb{F}_p)$ such that the x -coordinate of P is x .

And formally:

```
Lemma x_is_on_curve_or_twist :  
forall x : F2255-19,  
(exists (p : mc curve25519_mcuType), p#x0 = x) ∨  
(exists (p' : mc twist25519_mcuType), p'#x0 = x).
```

Qed.

N·Dei·NOMINE

From \mathbb{F}_p to \mathbb{F}_{p^2} and vice-versa

We define the two morphism:

Definition

Define the functions φ_c , φ_t and ψ

- $\varphi_c : M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_p) \mapsto M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ such that $\varphi((x,y)) = ((x,0), (y,0))$.
- $\varphi_t : M_{486662,2}(\mathbb{F}_p) \mapsto M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ such that $\varphi((x,y)) = ((x,0), (0,y))$.
- $\psi : \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \mapsto \mathbb{F}_p$ such that $\psi(x,y) = (x)$.

And prove:

Lemma

For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, for all point $P \in \mathbb{F}_p \times \mathbb{F}_p$ on the curve $M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_p)$ (respectively on the quadratic twist $M_{486662,2}(\mathbb{F}_p)$), we have:

$$P \in M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_p) \implies \varphi_c(n \cdot P) = n \cdot \varphi_c(P)$$

$$P \in M_{486662,2}(\mathbb{F}_p) \implies \varphi_t(n \cdot P) = n \cdot \varphi_t(P)$$

Notice that:

$$\forall P \in M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_p), \quad \psi(\chi_0(\varphi_c(P))) = \chi_0(P)$$

$$\forall P \in M_{486662,2}(\mathbb{F}_p), \quad \psi(\chi_0(\varphi_t(P))) = \chi_0(P)$$

Theorem

For all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, such that $n < 2^{255}$, for all $x \in \mathbb{F}_p$ and $P \in M_{486662,1}(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ such that $\chi_0(P) = x$,
 $\text{Curve25519_Fp}(n, x)$ computes $\chi_0(n \cdot P)$.

which is formalized in Coq as:

```
Theorem curve25519_Fp2_ladder_ok:  
forall (n : nat) (x:  $\mathbb{F}_{2^{255}-19}$ ),  
(n < 2255)%nat →  
forall (p : mc curve25519_Fp2_mcuType),  
p #x0 = Zmodp2.Zmodp2 x 0 →  
curve25519_Fp_ladder n x = (p *+ n)#x0 /p.  
Qed.
```

The implementation of X25519 in TweetNaCl computes the \mathbb{F}_p -restricted x-coordinate scalar multiplication on $E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ where p is $2^{255} - 19$ and E is the elliptic curve $y^2 = x^3 + 486662x^2 + x$.

Theorem RFC_Correct: `forall (n p : list Z)
(P:mc curve25519.Fp2_mcuType),
Zlength n = 32 →
Zlength p = 32 →
Forall (λ x ⇒ 0 ≤ x ∧ x < 2 ^ 8) n →
Forall (λ x ⇒ 0 ≤ x ∧ x < 2 ^ 8) p →
Fp2_x (decodeUCoordinate p) = P#x0 →
RFC n p =
 encodeUCoordinate
 ((P *+ (Z.to_nat (decodeScalar25519 n))) _x0).`

Qed.



Thank you.



Equivalences



Generic Operations

```
Class Ops (T T': Type) (Mod: T → T):=
{
  A:   T → T → T;          (* Addition      over T *)
  M:   T → T → T;          (* Multiplication over T *)
  Zub: T → T → T;          (* Subtraction    over T *)
  Sq:  T → T;              (* Squaring       over T *)
  C_0: T;                  (* Constant 0     in T *)
  C_1: T;                  (* Constant 1     in T *)
  C_121665: T;             (* Constant 121665 in T *)
  Sel25519: Z → T → T → T; (* Select the 2nd or 3rd argument depending of Z *)
  Getbit: Z → T' → Z;      (* Return the ith bit of T' *)

  (* Mod conservation *)
  Mod_ZSel25519_eq : forall b p q, Mod (Sel25519 b p q) = Sel25519 b (Mod p) (Mod q);
  Mod_ZA_eq :       forall p q,   Mod (A p q)           = Mod (A (Mod p) (Mod q));
  Mod_ZM_eq :       forall p q,   Mod (M p q)           = Mod (M (Mod p) (Mod q));
  Mod_ZZub_eq :      forall p q,  Mod (Zub p q)         = Mod (Zub (Mod p) (Mod q));
  Mod_ZSq_eq :      forall p,     Mod (Sq p)            = Mod (Sq (Mod p));

  Mod_red :          forall p,    Mod (Mod p)           = (Mod p)
}.
```

Generic Montgomery Ladder

```
Context {T : Type}.
Context {T' : Type}.
Context {Mod : T → T}.
Context {O : Ops T T' Mod}.

Fixpoint montgomery_rec (m : ℕ) (z : T') (a b c d e f x : T) : (T * T * T * T * T * T) :=
match m with
| 0 ⇒ (a,b,c,d,e,f)
| S n ⇒
  let r := Getbit (Z.of_nat n) z in
  let (a, b) := (Sel25519 r a b, Sel25519 r b a) in
  let (c, d) := (Sel25519 r c d, Sel25519 r d c) in
  let e := A a c in
  let a := Zub a c in
  let c := A b d in
  let b := Zub b d in
  let d := Sq e in
  let f := Sq a in
  let a := M c a in
  let c := M b e in
  let e := A a c in
  let a := Zub a c in
  let b := Sq a in
  let c := Zub d f in
  let a := M c C_121665 in
  let a := A a d in
  let c := M c a in
  let a := M d f in
  let d := M b x in
  let b := Sq e in
  let (a, b) := (Sel25519 r a b, Sel25519 r b a) in
  let (c, d) := (Sel25519 r c d, Sel25519 r d c) in
  montgomery_rec n z a b c d e f x
end.
```



Operations Equivalence

```
Class Ops_Mod_P {T T' U:Type}
  {Mod:U → U} {ModT:T → T}
  `(Ops T T' ModT) `(Ops U U Mod) := 
{
  P: T → U;      (* Projection from T to U *)
  P': T' → U;    (* Projection from T' to U *)
  A_eq:     forall a b, Mod (P (A a b)) = Mod (A (P a) (P b));
  M_eq:     forall a b, Mod (P (M a b)) = Mod (M (P a) (P b));
  Zub_eq:   forall a b, Mod (P (Zub a b)) = Mod (Zub (P a) (P b));
  Sq_eq:    forall a, Mod (P (Sq a)) = Mod (Sq (P a));
  C_121665_eq: P C_121665 = C_121665;
  C_0_eq:    P C_0 = C_0;
  C_1_eq:    P C_1 = C_1;
  Sel25519_eq: forall b p q, Mod (P (Sel25519 b p q)) = Mod (Sel25519 b (P p) (P q));
  Getbit_eq:  forall i p, Getbit i p = Getbit i (P' p);
}.
```

Generic Montgomery Equivalence

```
Context {T: Type}.
Context {T' : Type}.
Context {U: Type}.
Context {ModT: T → T}.
Context {Mod: U → U}.
Context {TO: Ops T T' ModT}.
Context {UO: Ops U U' Mod}.
Context {UTO: @Ops_Mod_P T T' U Mod ModT TO UO}.
```

(* montgomery_rec over T is equivalent to montgomery_rec over U *)

```
Corollary montgomery_rec_eq_a: forall (n:N) (z:T') (a b c d e f x: T),
  Mod (P (get_a (montgomery_rec n z a b c d e f x))) = (* over T *)
  Mod (get_a (montgomery_rec n (P' z) (P a) (P b) (P c) (P d) (P e) (P f) (P x))). (* over U *)
Qed.
```

```
Corollary montgomery_rec_eq_c: forall (n:N) (z:T') (a b c d e f x: T),
  Mod (P (get_c (montgomery_rec n z a b c d e f x))) = (* over T *)
  Mod (get_c (montgomery_rec n (P' z) (P a) (P b) (P c) (P d) (P e) (P f) (P x))). (* over U *)
Qed.
```

W.Del-NOMINEE

Instanciating

```
Definition modP (x: ℤ) := x mod 2255 - 19.

(* Operations over ℤ *)
Instance Z_Ops : @Ops ℤ ℤ modP := {}.

(* Operations over ℤ *)
Instance Z25519_Ops : Ops ℤ modP id := {}.

(* Equivalence between ℤ (with modP) and ℤ *)
Instance Zmod_Z_Eq : @Ops_Mod_P ℤ ℤ modP modP Z_Ops Z_Ops :=
{ P := modP; P' := id }.

(* Equivalence between ℤ (with modP) and ℤ *)
Instance Z25519_Z_Eq : @Ops_Mod_P ℤ modP id Z25519_Ops Z_Ops :=
{ P := val; P' := ℤ.of_nat }.

Inductive List16 (T:Type) := Len (l:list T): Zlength l = 16 → List16 T.
Inductive List32B := L32B (l:list ℤ): Forall (λ x ⇒ 0 ≤ x < 28) l → List32B.

(* Operations over List16,List32 *)
Instance List16_Ops : Ops (@List16 ℤ) List32B id := {}.

(* Equivalence between List16,List32 and ℤ *)
Instance List16_Z_Eq : @Ops_Mod_P (@List16 ℤ) (List32B) ℤ modP id List16_Ops Z_Ops :=
{ P l := (ZofList 16 (List16_to_List l)); P' l := (ZofList 8 (List32_to_List l)); }.

(* Operations over list of ℤ *)
Instance List_Z_Ops : Ops (list ℤ) (list ℤ) id := {}.

(* Equivalence between List16,List32 and list of ℤ *)
Instance List16_List_Z_Eq : @Ops_Mod_P (List16 ℤ) (List32B) (list ℤ) id id List16_Ops List_Z_Ops :=
{ P := List16_to_List; P' := List32_to_List }.
```

Full Equivalence

